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Understanding what another agent can see relates functionally to the understanding of
what they can do. We propose that spatial perspective taking and perceiving other’s
affordances, while two separate spatial processes, together share the common social
function of predicting the behavior of others. Perceiving the action capabilities of others
allows for a common understanding of how agents may act together. The ability to
take another’s perspective focuses an understanding of action goals so that more
precise understanding of intentions may result. This review presents an analysis of
these complementary abilities, both in terms of the frames of reference and the
proposed sensorimotor mechanisms involved. Together, we argue for the importance of
reconsidering the role of basic spatial processes to explain more complex behaviors.
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How can different people look at the same object or event and
perceive (pretty much) the same thing?. . . What is even more
intriguing is the possibility that I can perceive the meaning
afforded by the existing layout of surfaces in the environment for
another person as well as for me. What underlies the commonality
of perception across diverse individuals? (Mark, 2007, p. 108)
Humans are inherently social beings as evident by the fact that
we live in families, work in groups, share meals with one another,
relax with friends, and are often entertained by watching the lives
of other humans. This is not a new idea, but rather the motivation
for establishing the field of social psychology. Furthermore, the
“ecological dominance—social competition model” proposed by
Alexander (1990), suggests that one of the most influential evolu-
tionary pressures that shaped human intelligence was “...a within-
species co-evolutionary arms race in which success depended on
effectiveness in social competition” (pp. 4–7). Whether one is try-
ing to gauge an enemy’s weakness, or striving to cooperate with a
friend, the ability to predict the future behavior of other humans
allows actors to adjust their current behavior, providing them
with a powerful social advantage (for a review, see Flinn et al.,
2005).
Predicting the future behavior of others involves both an
understanding of what another person is capable of doing and an
understanding of their current goals. Studies that have explored
how a viewer makes judgments of another’s action capabilities—
other’s affordances—have revealed that viewers can adequately
judge what another is capable of performing when provided
information about this others’ ability to act (e.g., body dimen-
sions or kinematic information). The ability to take the spatial
perspective of another person may provide information about
the goals of this other person by revealing their line of sight.
While judging other’s affordances and spatial perspective taking
are often studied under the disciplines of perception and spa-
tial cognition, we propose that these two abilities may also work
together to build a foundation for social cognition. Our goal is
to review the literature from both domains to determine how
spatial perspective taking and the perception of other’s affordances
work together to predict the behavior of others. In addition, we
will review neurological evidence that may provide a biological
mechanism common to both processes.
We begin with a review of the behavioral evidence demon-
strating that observers have an understanding of what others
can do through explicit judgments of affordances for another
agent. Second, we review the evidence that spatial perspec-
tive taking can reveal the intentions of another agent. Then,
we consider how spatial perspective taking and judging affor-
dances for others may be integrated to provide an observer
with the information necessary to predict the behavior of oth-
ers. Next, we consider two distinct but not necessarily exclusive
accounts of the underlying mechanisms of social perception
and action—motor resonance/simulation (Sebanz et al., 2003;
Bosbach et al., 2005; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011) and ecologi-
cal approach/information-based (Marsh et al., 2006; Ramenzoni
et al., 2008b). We discuss evidence for the possibility of shared
mechanisms with spatial perspective taking and similarities and
differences between the way frames of reference are used. Self-
judgments are made with respect to the viewer’s reference frame
(egocentric). An important theme is whether judgments about
another agent use a transformation of the viewer’s reference frame
onto the other’s egocentric reference frame to update spatial
relations (termed egocentric transformation), or the use of an allo-
centric frame—the use of relative spatial relations between two
points outside of one’s egocentric frame. We conclude with a
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discussion of how both abilities, judging other’s affordances and
taking the perspective of another, while likely different processes,
rely on a social context and support the broader goal of social
coordination.
PERCEIVED SELF-AFFORDANCES
Knowing what another person is capable of doing is often con-
sidered in the context of the theory of affordances (Gibson,
1979). Gibson’s (1979) ecological theory of perception stated
that the perception of the environment is directly related to
the actions that one is capable of performing in the environ-
ment. The term affordance is used to describe the fit between
environmental (perceived through the senses) and person fea-
tures (e.g., size of the body or kinematic capabilities; Michaels
and Carello, 1981; Turvey, 1992; Stoffregen, 2003; Plumert et al.,
2004). For example, a tree branch lying on the ground can afford
sitting, stepping on, or stepping over. A tree branch placed suffi-
ciently higher does not afford sitting or stepping over, but may
instead afford walking under. In sum, affordances are oppor-
tunities for action present in the environment that are defined
by the observer’s action capabilities (Turvey, 1992; Stoffregen,
2003).
People are able to judge whether an environment affords a
particular action without executing the actual action (termed
affordance judgment) and scale environmental features to their
abilities (Mark, 1987; Warren and Whang, 1987). For example,
Warren and Whang (1987) found that people required apertures
to be 1.16 times their shoulder width when judging whether an
aperture afforded non-rotated passage. They also found that this
affordance was scaled to the eye height of the participant suggest-
ing that the visual information was related to body dimensions
and abilities. Other body dimensions are taken into account for
other types of actions. For instance, the maximum climbable sur-
face has been found to be about 0.88 times the length of the actor’s
leg (Warren, 1984; Mark and Vogele, 1988). The critical bound-
ary has been identified for a number of different actions including
grasping (Newell et al., 1989) sitting (Mark, 1987), and reaching
(Carello et al., 1989).
Affordances can also be learned or recalibrated to fit new
capabilities or novel environments (Wagman and Taylor, 2005;
Ishak et al., 2008). Ishak et al. (2008) demonstrated that par-
ticipants were able to recalibrate decisions about whether their
hand could fit through an aperture when their hand was made
larger. Wagman and Taylor (2005) manipulated the width of par-
ticipants by having them hold a t-shaped object at their waist.
They showed that participants almost instantly recalibrated judg-
ments of passage through an aperture when their body size was
widened by holding the pole. They attributed the immediacy
of recalibration to the ability of participants to determine the
length of the pole by wielding it prior to judgments. Higuchi
et al. (2004) investigated the ability of novice wheelchair users
to judge their ability to pass through an aperture when in the
wheelchair. They found that novice users often judged aper-
tures to be passable when they would not actually fit through
in the wheelchair (aperture to wheelchair width ratio of.92).
While participants’ judgments improved after 8 days of prac-
tice with the wheelchair, they did not reach levels observed in
baseline performance (without the wheelchair). Under a differ-
ent paradigm, Mark (1987) and Mark et al. (1990) investigated
how an actor comes to know the specific relationship between
an environmental extent and their action capability. Mark (1987)
altered standing eye height by requiring participants to wear
10 cm blocks underfoot. They then judged their ability to sit
on surfaces of different heights. Without practice sitting, par-
ticipants’ judgments of what they could sit on returned to the
critical boundary when not wearing blocks over the course of 30
trials. Mark et al. (1990) then systematically manipulated infor-
mation available to the participant when wearing the blocks. They
found that participants were able to recalibrate their judgments
of sitability to their new height when they were able to loco-
mote, move their heads or eyes, or lean to the side. Restricting
visual information by providing only monocular viewing through
a peephole or restricting movement by requiring participants to
rest their heads against a wall significantly reduced participants’
ability to recalibrate information and judge sitability with blocks
underfoot.
This body of work is important because it shows that people
are fairly accurate in judging what they are capable of performing
in an environment. This work also demonstrates that people are
able to quickly calibrate their affordance judgments to changes in
their ability to act. The rate of recalibration is often determined
by the degree to which observers experience or gain informa-
tion about the change to their capabilities. Others have theorized
that flexibility in affordance judgments and the performance of
actions is necessary to deal with changes in the demands of the sit-
uation, changes to the criteria for success (the goal), and changes
with the availability of visual information (Fajen et al., 2009).
Importantly, this work demonstrates that all of the information
necessary to judge and carry out an action is available to the
person in the ambient stimulus arrays in which the person is
immersed.
PERCEIVING OTHERS’ AFFORDANCES
As introduced above, affordances for the self are typically
grounded in an egocentric frame of reference and scaled in
terms of one’s body dimensions with respect to the current
viewpoint. However, when judgments of other people’s affor-
dances are made, it is possible that observers switch to an
allocentric frame of reference. We define allocentric judgments
as those that are relative judgments made between two points,
outside of the self. As such, the environment is scaled to the
other’s body rather to one’s own (Stoffregen et al., 1999). Rochat
(1995) examined reaching affordances of children and adults,
asking whether young children distinguish reachability for them-
selves and others. The findings revealed that both children and
adults scaled their judgments of reaching to their own physical
characteristics in the self-judgments and to the other’s physi-
cal characteristics for judgments of the other. In addition, all
subjects showed the ability to take into account the other’s
change in reaching height when viewing the other on “tip-toes.”
These findings suggest an early ability to switch from an ego-
centric to an allocentric frame of reference in this task. More
recent studies with adults have focused on judging others’ affor-
dances when the action involves either a single other person
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or the potential actions of dyads (the observer and another
person).
AFFORDANCES FOR ONE OTHER
For single-person affordances, multiple studies have shown that
observers accurately scale environmental features to the action
capabilities of the actor being observed (Stoffregen et al., 1999;
Ramenzoni et al., 2008b,c, 2010). Stoffregen et al. (1999) exam-
ined observers’ abilities to perceive the maximum height at which
another actor could sit. In this extensive study, the observer
judged their own and another actor’s affordances for sitting, while
varying the height of the other actor as well as the viewer’s
experience with observing kinematic displays of the other actor
perform non-sitting actions. They found that affordances of oth-
ers were scaled with respect to the actor’s leg length. In addition,
Ramenzoni et al. (2008b) tested judgments of maximum reach-
ing height of the self and another with the goal of testing whether
eye-height information would be used. Observers judged how
high they or a different sized actor could reach an object while
the observer stood on the floor, or one of two different sized
steps. The other actor always remained standing on the floor.
Judgments, when scaled to the observer’s reaching height for the
self and to the actor’s reaching height for the other, were near
1.0, indicating that estimates were very accurate, both for self
and other. These results support the notion that affordances are
scaled to the intrinsic units of the observer (in self-judgments)
or actor (in other judgments). Mark (2007) summarizes a series
of studies following up on these findings, replicating the effect
for sitting, climbing, and stepping affordances. These studies
argue for the claim that an allocentric frame of reference is
adopted when judging affordances for others and that observers
can do this in the context of judging their own affordances
as well-switching easily from an egocentric to an allocentric
framework.
Some actions, like jumping-and-reaching, require the observer
to have information about the actor’s kinematic abilities and not
just information about the size of the actor (Weast et al., 2011).
Stoffregen et al. (1999) found that when observers were provided
with the appropriate information about the underlying dynamic
actor properties, they could accurately judge the other’s ability.
In addition, Ramenzoni et al. (2010) asked whether a learning
paradigm would influence maximum jump to reach estimates for
another actor over multiple repeated trials in a similar manner as
self-judgments. They found an increase in accuracy across trials
for self-estimates, but not for actor estimates. The lack of changes
over time in the other’s judgments suggests that judgments of
others are not dependent on judgments of self. However, their
second study tested the influence of watching the actor perform
a task related in dynamics (lifting) or unrelated to the dynamics
of jumping and reaching (torso-twist) on judgments of reach-by-
jump for both the self and the other. They found that watching
an actor perform a related task improved the accuracy of the esti-
mates of the actor’s capabilities but watching the unrelated task
did not help. The second experiment showed that experience with
another’s kinematic abilities facilitates related affordance judg-
ments, suggesting the importance of calibrating the observer to
specific action-relevant information about the actor’s capabilities.
Weast et al. (2011) investigated how expertise influenced the per-
ception of affordances for others. They found that basketball play-
ers were better than novices at judging the jump-and-reach height
of another actor but that basketball players were no better than
novices at judging a non-sports-relevant action (sitting height).
In their second study, they demonstrated that with exposure
to kinematic information, basketball players’, but not novices,
judgment of maximum jump-and-reach improved. This finding
suggested that basketball players had enhanced sensitivity to kine-
matic information. These findings emphasize the claim that the
relationship between the other’s physical body parameters (e.g.,
size and capabilities) and the environment, as well as degree to
which someone has experience with a specific relationship, is
critical in informing decisions about others’ ability to act in the
environment.
Another series of studies examined the ability and accuracy of
adults to judge reachability of children (Cordovil and Barreiros,
2010, 2011) generally supporting the claim that observers scale
affordances to the other’s body, but also showing less consistent
overestimation in judgments of children’s reaching compared to
adult self-judgments. As in Ramenzoni et al. (2010); Cordovil
et al. (2013) asked whether accuracy in judging another’s affor-
dance may be a function of experience or practice. Cordovil et al.
(2013) tested adults’ judgments of the maximum standing reach-
ability, reach and jump reachability, and step-length of a 5 year
old boy, before and after observing the boy perform the action.
They found that viewing the boy’s actual affordance improved the
more complex affordances (jump-to-reach and step-length) but
had little effect on the basic reaching while standing judgment.
The observation/practice manipulation suggests that when given
more information about the relationship between the other actor
and the environment, observers can calibrate the information to
adjust their response.
A somewhat different take-home message comes from
Ramenzoni et al. (2008a) in a study of perceived maximum
reach by jumping. The observer’s capability to jump was manip-
ulated by wearing ankle weights. Judgments were made both for
the self and for another actor who did not wear ankle weights.
Interestingly, estimations of jumping-reach height were lowered
not only for the self, but also for the other actor, specifically
after the observer walked while wearing the weights. The effect of
ankle weights to reduce the critical boundary of reach by jump-
ing is consistent with the body of work showing that effort or
behavioral potential influences spatial judgments (Proffitt, 2006).
However, what is unique about these findings is that the manip-
ulation affected judgments of what someone else could do. These
results support a social context underlying perceived affordances
and suggest that judging others action capabilities may rely some-
what on how the observer herself can act. Thus, the task becomes
one at least partially based in the observer’s egocentric frame
of reference. Notably, in this study, observers may not have had
sufficient information about the actor’s jumping ability to rely
solely on the relationship between the other and the environ-
ment to make their judgment. The influence of the ankle weights
on judgments of the actor’s capabilities may be erased if suf-
ficient information about the actor’s kinematic capabilities is
provided.
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AFFORDANCES FOR DYADS
Another way in which researchers have assessed the ability to
judge others’ affordances has been to examine dyads or joint
actions. This work looks at how observers are able to make deci-
sions about actions when these actions are to be performed in
correspondence with another person. This is especially interest-
ing because, unlike the single-person judgments, observer and
actor actions necessarily have a direct influence on one another.
Further, different action capabilities may result as two observers
coordinate their actions (Isenhower et al., 2010). Chang et al.
(2009) took this approach in an environment-person-person
system, testing whether adults would accurately estimate their
ability to pass through an aperture while walking through with
a child. The adult and child were attached with a Velcro strip at
the child’s elbow and the adult’s wrist. The results showed that
adults were able to accurately perceive affordances for passage
with the child. Consistent with the self and single-actor stud-
ies, the results revealed that judgments were scaled additively to
the intrinsic units of the adult shoulder width + child shoulder
width.
Similarly, Davis et al. (2010) assessed how two adults per-
formed the joint action of walking through an aperture. First,
they established that a “shared” model, rather than an addi-
tive model, better predicted the critical boundary for the dyad’s
actual passage. This showed that the critical aperture width was
less than the sum of the critical aperture widths for each actor
separately suggesting that coordinated actions are scaled to the
combined action capabilities of the two actors. Further, they
examined the influence of action-observation experience on per-
ceived affordances for passage of the self and the other actor.
Participants either viewed the other actor walk, walked along-
side the actor, or viewed the actor standing only. As in previ-
ous work, the ratio of critical width to actual shoulder width
(scaled to the participant for self-judgments and the actor for
other judgments) were nearly identical, suggesting the ability to
use the other’s intrinsic scale to make estimates. However, the
dyad estimates were significantly underestimated with respect
to the actual joint affordance. Furthermore, unlike some of the
previous work, there was no effect of the increased action-
observation conditions. The reduced accuracy in response is
similar to the person-plus-tool studies mentioned above (Higuchi
et al., 2004; Wagman and Taylor, 2005), and is likely a result
of insufficient information or lack of experience walking as
a dyad.
The body of literature on perceiving affordances for one other
and for dyads suggests that observers are capable of judging
what another person can perform. These judgments are likely
completed by using an allocentric frame of reference, and they
reveal what actions another person is or is not capable of per-
forming in the current environment. In addition, an observer’s
judgments about another person are scaled to the action capa-
bilities of the other person or the other person + self system.
When making judgments about actions that require more than
a relative size comparison, observer’s judgments about another’s
affordances improve when they see the actor perform simi-
lar dynamic movements. There is also evidence that when an
observer is not provided with kinematic information about the
actor that the observer may use their own ability as a base-
line to judge what another could perform. Notably, much of
the existing literature involves judgments of others in tasks such
as walking through apertures that does not involve critical time
constraints. It may be that in more interactive dyadic tasks,
such as lifting a box together, different information relevant
to action coordination is used (see later section on synergistic
accounts). In all, the evidence points to the use of an allocentric
frame of reference generally used for perceiving other’s affor-
dances, with the influence of an egocentric frame of reference
when there is insufficient information available about the other’s
capabilities.
OTHER’S AFFORDANCES: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
There is clear evidence for the human ability to judge what others
can do, as well as to use what others can do to influence their
own action judgments. Together, this work reinforces the idea
that others’ affordances are used as an important component in
the broader problem of predicting the future behavior of others.
However, if humans only had at their disposal the ability to judge
action capabilities for another, they would have to consider all
of the affordances that a given environment offers to this other
person. This would be a rather cumbersome way to predict the
behavior of others, unless there was a meaningful way to focus
on only a few affordances. The theory of affordances (reviewed
above) may provide some insight to this problem. When perceiv-
ing affordances for oneself, observers orient their senses to the
properties of the environment that are necessary for perceiving a
particular affordance. For example, if someone intends to grasp
an object sitting atop a tall shelf, they will likely look in the direc-
tion of the object. If they can reach the object they will then do
so, otherwise they will likely look around for a heightened sur-
face that affords standing/climbing and will use this surface to
reach the object. Therefore, assuming that other people also ori-
ent their senses to pick up information relevant to a potential
action, an observer can simply identify where this other person
is looking and consider the actions that this spatial location may
afford for the other person. Much of the research that has exam-
ined our ability to detect where another person is looking, what
they can/cannot see, and their spatial relationship to other objects
in the environment is called spatial perspective-taking and will be
reviewed next.
SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING
Research on spatial perspective taking has a long history across
both developmental and cognitive psychology ranging from
Piaget’s classic three mountain task (Piaget and Inhelder, 1967)
to a comparison of physical and imagined body rotations (Rieser,
1989). The role that spatial perspective taking plays in spatial
memory and navigation has also been examined (Loomis et al.,
1999; Shelton and McNamara, 2004). Perspective-taking research
is also interested in how observers determine what another per-
son can or cannot see, and is often called joint (shared) visual
attention (Frischen et al., 2007). In general, spatial perspective
taking encompasses a class of phenomena that involve accessing
spatial information relative to a viewpoint different from one’s
own egocentric viewpoint. Importantly, we will examine whether
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these abilities may allow an observer to suppose the intentions of
another person.
Spatial perspective taking can be differentiated into Level-1
perspective taking (PT-1) and Level-2 perspective taking (PT-2)
based on developmental stages and proposed underlying pro-
cesses (Salatas and Flavell, 1976; Kessler and Rutherford, 2010).
PT-1 is often defined as a visibility task in which an observer
determines what another person can or cannot see. One of the
first studies examining this type of task with adults was aimed
at establishing shared common ground in a virtual environment.
Kelly et al. (2004) asked observers in the real world or in a
virtual environment to judge whether another agent could see
a given target in the environment. The scene was purposefully
chosen (or created in VR) so that there was an occluding build-
ing, and the viewer was given instructions to judge which parts
of the scene were visible from the other’s viewpoint and which
were occluded by the building. They indicated this on a pho-
tograph of the scene (in the real world) or by pointing to the
location in the virtual world. Viewers were generally good at
this task across both environments, but overestimated what the
agent could see as the distance between the viewer and the agent
increased from 5 to 10 to 15m. This work suggests that PT-1 may
utilize an allocentric frame of reference in which observers visu-
ally match various distances and angles to infer the line of sight of
another.
In contrast, PT-2 typically requires an observer to identify
where in space a target object is located relative to a viewpoint
that is different from the observer’s current viewpoint. For exam-
ple, in early work on imagined and real transformations, Rieser
(1989) asked participants to learn the location of an array of
objects while standing in the middle of the array. While blind-
folded, they were asked to point in the direction of a named
target from a new imagined viewpoint. Then they were asked
to imagine facing in a new direction (rotation task) or to imag-
ine moving to a new target location while continuing to face in
the same cardinal direction (translation task). This and other
work (e.g., Presson and Montello, 1994; May, 2007) showed a
robust angular disparity effect in the imagined rotation task,
such that reaction time increased with the increasing dispar-
ity between one’s actual facing and imagined facing direction.
This was significantly different from the virtually flat response
time function found in real rotations, suggesting a cost to per-
form the mental transformation to judge what the spatial layout
looked like outside of one’s physical viewing perspective. From
this work, Rieser (1989) and Presson and Montello (1994) sug-
gested that the angular disparity effect found in PT-2 tasks is due
to the increased processing involved in updating self-to-object
relationships.
May (2004, 2007) suggested that the angular disparity effect
may be due to a conflict of sensorimotor codes. Specifically,
a conflict in sensorimotor codes occurs between codes that
help identify the location of a target object from the to-be-
imagined viewpoint, and the codes that help the observer actually
make a pointing response. This was initial evidence that PT-
2 involves a shift from one egocentric frame of reference to
another egocentric frame of reference. Kessler and Thomson
(2010) provided additional support for the use of egocentric
reference frames during PT-2 by showing that the observer may
actually imagine rotating her body axes to align with the to-
be-imagined perspective. They asked participants to indicate
whether an object was located to the left or the right of an
avatar situated at 0, 40, 80, 120, or 160◦ around a circular
table with respect to the participant’s viewpoint. Importantly,
the authors situated the participants at the computer such that
their bodies were either facing straight ahead toward the moni-
tor, or at a 40◦ angle from the monitor. They found an overall
effect of body posture that increased monotonically with angu-
lar disparity. In other words, observers switch from their current
egocentric viewpoint to the egocentric viewpoint of another per-
son in space in order to mentally transform their body axes
through the space. May and Wendt (2012) have more recently
pointed out that some egocentric mental transformation tasks
also face stimulus-response compatibility effects, where spatial
conflict may contribute to the apparent mental transformation
effects.
Overall, the difference between visibility tasks (PT-1) and
determining spatial relationships from a new perspective (PT-2)
may be the object relations that are used. Inter-object rela-
tions may be used to determine whether something is visible
from another’s perspective. However, when updating to a new
left/right position respective to that perspective, rotation of the
viewer’s frame of reference is needed. In support of this claim,
several have found that left/right decisions involve increasing
response time with increasing angular disparity, whereas visibil-
ity/front back decision show relatively flat response time func-
tions as a function of angular disparity but increasing response
time as a function of distance between the agent and the tar-
get (Michelon and Zacks, 2006; Kessler and Rutherford, 2010).
In summary, PT-1 appears to rely on an allocentric frame of
reference, determining the location of an object with respect to
another’s viewpoint whereas often PT-2 relies on the transforma-
tion of the egocentric reference frame onto the other’s viewpoint,
in order to update object spatial relations with respect to the new
viewpoint.
OTHERS AND SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING
Both PT-1 and PT-2 can contribute to a viewer’s ability to pre-
dict the behavior of others. Several examples come from the
study of spatial language in which different frames of refer-
ence may be used to produce spatial descriptions to a partner
depending on the social context. Generally, these studies show
that attributional cues about the partner influence how peo-
ple interpret and produce spatial descriptions. When speakers
perceive that partners have less knowledge or relevance to the
task—due to a number of factors such as lower spatial abili-
ties, less familiarity, less agency, or less information about the
viewpoint—then speakers are more likely to take a partner-
centered frame of reference (Schober, 2009; Duran et al., 2011;
Galati et al., 2013). In other words, when the observer real-
izes there is less of a shared perspective, they will adjust their
language to meet the needs of the partner. When the part-
ner’s goals, realism/presence, or shared mutual understanding
increase, then speakers are more likely to use their own egocentric
perspective.
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Further, in a simple, but elegant manipulation of the visual
presence and goals of an agent, Tversky and Hard (2009) showed
that the presence of another person in a scene changed the way
people described the left/right relationship between two objects.
Observers viewed a photograph of two objects on a table, with
or without a person seated across the table either looking at
or reaching for one of the objects. The frequency of reporting
the relationship of the two objects from the other’s perspec-
tive increased with the presence of the person, and increased
further when the question referred to action. These results sug-
gest that even outside of an explicit communication task, view-
ers will spontaneously take the perspective of another person.
Spontaneous perspective taking was also seen in Samson et al.
(2010), who required a viewer to judge (in a picture) how many
discs on a wall could be seen from their own perspective or from
an avatar’s perspective (a PT-1 visibility task). The number of
discs that the avatar could see was either consistent or incon-
sistent with the number of discs from the viewer’s egocentric
perspective. Viewers were slower to make their egocentric judg-
ments when there was a conflict with the avatar’s perspective,
even though the avatar perspective had no direct relevance to
their task.
Consistent with these results, implicit perspective taking has
also been shown with an action-based mimicry task. For exam-
ple, participants viewed a virtual tight-rope walking avatar
while they were simultaneously asked to imagine also being
on a tight-rope (Thirioux et al., 2009). The participants were
told to lean the way the avatar was leaning, not specify-
ing whether to lean as if the avatar was a mirror reflection,
or to lean as if they were in the shoes of the avatar. The
study found that the participants adopted the viewpoint of
the avatar instead of mirroring the avatar nearly 70 percent of
the time.
Many of these studies tend to naturally confound body ori-
entation or depicted action with eye gaze. Mazzarella et al.
(2012) decoupled action and eye gaze in stimuli depicting another
agent to assess when perspective taking would occur. In con-
trast to Tversky and Hard (2009), they first used an explicit
perspective taking task in which participants were instructed to
report target location from either an egocentric perspective or
the agent’s perspective. Participants viewed scenes with an agent
positioned across the table with an object. The scenes varied
as to whether the agent looked at or grasped the object. Given
the explicit task of taking an egocentric or allocentric frame
of reference, it is not surprising that viewers made few allo-
centric errors in the egocentric condition. However, the results
also showed that in the explicit allocentric condition, view-
ers were better in their allocentric judgments when the actor
was depicted as grasping the object, with no significant influ-
ence of eye gaze. A third experiment distinguished between
the effects of grasping and gaze on perspective taking and
attentional orienting. When the task was to detect an object
after being presented with the agent-in-action/agent-gaze images,
participants were faster with the gaze image than the action
image. These results suggest that gaze and body/action informa-
tion may provide different information about others’ intentions.
Arm/body cues may be more useful in communicating current
goals and eye gaze may indicate what the actor will do in the
future.
SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING WITH OTHERS: SUMMARY
AND OPEN QUESTIONS
Overall, the work reviewed on spatial perspective taking with oth-
ers describes two types of tasks, Level-1 and Level-2, which are
both elicited in the context of another agent. First, this work sug-
gests that observers may identify the intentions of another by
considering where they are looking (PT-1). Second, this work sug-
gests that the body of the other may indicate current goals of the
actor while the eye gaze of the actor may denote future goals. Both
could be used to understand the intentions of others. Finally, the
work reviewed suggests that PT-1 uses an allocentric frame of ref-
erence while PT-2 involves shifting from one egocentric reference
frame to another’s egocentric reference frame.
Much of the spatial perspective taking research has been
designed to understand spatial memory, language, navigation,
and overall spatial cognition. However, very little of this work
has considered the broader social function of spatial perspective
taking—predicting other’s behavior in the service of coordinating
actions. If spatial perspective taking operates in conjunction with
perceiving affordances for others, it may have evolved to help us
infer an intention or goal for another person. When used along-
side the ability to judge this other person’s action capabilities,
both may allow humans to make fairly accurate predictions about
what another person is likely to do next. In turn, observers are able
to adjust their own actions to coincide, cooperate, or compete
with another person’s current and future behaviors.
SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING AND PERCEIVED ACTION
CAPABILITIES MUTUALLY INFORM BEHAVIOR PREDICTION
HOW LEVEL-1 PERSPECTIVE TAKING AND JUDGING AFFORDANCES
FOR OTHERS MAYWORK TOGETHER
Gibson (1979) argued that all of the information necessary to
judge affordances is available to any point of observation (see also
Stoffregen et al., 1999; Mark, 2007). Likewise, information speci-
fying one’s line of sight is also available in the optic array. Both
PT-1 and perceiving affordances for others utilize an allocen-
tric frame of reference because both processes can be carried out
using object-to-object relationships, likely with a visual matching
strategy. Although it is unknown how humans (or other species)
determine where another is looking, it is plausible that visual
information regarding the direction of one’s gaze is combined
with perceptual information identifying the distance and depth
of objects in the environment (see Kelly et al., 2004 for a similar
view). Together, it may be possible for an observer to see another
person and simultaneously know (1) where they are looking and
(2) what actions they are capable of performing given the prop-
erties of the environment. This would suggest that the line of
sight operates to orient the observer’s attention to the properties
of the environment that must be considered alongside the bodily
capabilities of the other person. Such a process is consistent with
Kugler and Turvey’s (1987) definition of an intention being an
attribution that an observer projects on to another person to sim-
plify what behaviors might be expected from this person. They
use an example in physics, in which temperature and pressure are
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concepts used to understand collective properties of molecules.
The temperature of a substance is attributed to the molecules by
the observer in an attempt to describe higher level processes when
describing the individual movement of each molecule is cum-
bersome. Much the same, attributing intentions to an actor, is a
method by which an observer attempts to reduce the many pos-
sible actions available to an actor to a subset few and in so doing
describes the demands of the environment that are placed on the
actor. Future research should consider testing the possibility that
Level-1 perspective taking occurs when attempting to predict the
behavior of others.
HOW LEVEL-2 PERSPECTIVE TAKING AND JUDGING AFFORDANCES
FOR OTHERS MAYWORK TOGETHER
Level-2 perspective taking is distinguishable from Level-1 based
on the extent to which observer-centered spatial transformations
are needed (as discussed above). PT-2 reveals to an observer the
spatial relationship between a person and objects in the environ-
ment. For example, you can sit across the table from a friend,
and while your friend’s cup may be on your right-hand side,
you are able to identify that the cup is on your friend’s left-hand
side. There are many different models that attempt to account for
this ability to discriminate one’s own perspective from another.
Overwhelmingly the evidence suggests that the observer must
imagine a rotation of their body axes or frame of reference, pos-
sibly involving the motor, proprioceptive, or vestibular system to
accomplish this task (Grabherr et al., 2007; Kessler and Thomson,
2010). PT-2 requires that the observer transform their own ego-
centric frame of reference to the egocentric frame of reference
of another person. This is different from how reference frames
are utilized when perceiving affordances for others, as judging
another’s affordances likely involves a shift from the observer’s
egocentric frame of reference to an allocentric (other-to-object)
frame of reference.
Regardless of the use of different frames of reference, the inten-
tions of another actor may still be inferred through PT-2 when
an asymmetry exists between the other’s left and right side. For
example, if another person is holding a rod in their right hand,
their ability to reach to objects differs for their right and left sides
(Linkenauger et al., 2009). Thus, one could infer that the actor is
more likely to reach with her right hand, an understanding that
may be critical for a task involving joint action. However, when
a distinction between what is on the left or right of an actor is
not needed, PT-2 processes are not likely relied on for judging
affordances of others. Instead, the observer can visually match the
length of the actor’s arm (or arm plus rod) to the distance between
the actor and some object, thereby inferring what the actor can
do by using an allocentric reference frame from the observer’s
viewpoint. However, PT-2 perspective taking could be integral for
successful communication in which two or more people need to
create a common conception of the space (Duran et al., 2011). In
addition, PT-2 perspective taking appears to be closely related to
path integration during navigation, and developing a geocentric
view (bird’s eye view) of the space (Loomis et al., 1999). In con-
clusion, it may be the case that PT-2 perspective taking is not used
when determining the intentions of other people unless future
coordination is required.
SELF AND OTHER AFFORDANCES MUTUALLY INFORM
BEHAVIOR PREDICTION
There are instances in which information about the observer may
be used to understand the capabilities of another, and conversely,
instances where the capabilities of another influence actions or
judgments about the self. For example, in joint action, previ-
ous research suggests that observers consider not only their own
action capabilities, but also the action capabilities of another per-
son (Sebanz et al., 2006). Even when joint action is not an explicit
goal, recent evidence suggests that judging affordances for one-
self can be influenced by the action capabilities of another person
(Gagnon et al., in preparation). In our own recent work (Gagnon
et al., in preparation) we examined both the influence of one’s
own body size on affordance judgments for another, and the
influence of another’s size on self-judgments. In a paradigm using
judgments of passage through apertures, we found that the judg-
ments for another are scaled to the other’s body size, but that there
is an additional mutual influence of the self on other judgments
and the other on self-judgments.
In addition, Costantini et al. (2011) tested the influence of
the affordances of another agent on the spatial alignment effect
paradigm (Bub and Masson, 2010)—an effect showing that
action-relevant but task-irrelevant objects will facilitate actions
when the object is congruent with the action. Previous work
showed that in a desktop virtual environment, the presentation
of a mug facilitated a grasp response, but only when it reach-
able by the actor as depicted in the virtual scene (Costantini
et al., 2010). Costantini et al. (2011) extended this paradigm and
found that the viewer’s motor facilitation also occurred when
the object was outside of the viewer’s reachable space but within
an agent’s reachable space. They suggest that the space in which
the actor can perform an action might be “mapped on” to the
observer’s bodily spatial representation, influencing the observer’s
own potential to act. This could inform an observer about how
another agent perceives a space and capability for action, as
well as providing information for joint action (Costantini et al.,
2011).
Related spontaneous use of another’s potential for action has
been demonstrated in a distance judgment task that varied the
extent to which another agent could reach a target (Bloesch et al.,
2012). Bloesch et al. proposed that if using a tool makes a dis-
tance appear closer (see also Witt et al., 2005), then it may be
that watching another agent use a tool also influences perceived
distance. These predictions held true; observers who watched
another actor reach successfully to a target with a reach-extending
tool judged the distance to be closer than those who watched an
unsuccessful arm-based reach.
As social beings, the mere presence of another person may
prompt humans to share (implicitly or explicitly) spatial and pro-
prioceptive information with each other. Oullier et al. (2008)
found that when two people see each other performing the
same action, they spontaneously synchronize their actions, sug-
gesting a means of information exchange that could coordinate
actions. Whether these examples are an instance of a trans-
formation of one’s egocentric frame of reference is unknown.
Regardless, this work suggests that spatial and propriocep-
tive information is not necessarily confined to the physical
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boundaries of a person, but can be shared amongst two or more
people.
POSSIBLE OVERLAPPING MECHANISMS SUPPORTING
OTHER’S AFFORDANCES AND SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE
TAKING
Given the relationship between judging others’ affordances and
spatial perspective taking is somewhat unclear from the behav-
ioral work, it may be useful to consider whether the process of
judging other’s affordances and spatial perspective taking share
overlapping processes relying on motor simulation. First, we will
review the proposed mechanisms involved in perspective tak-
ing, and then relate this to the potential mechanisms involved in
perceiving affordances for others.
MECHANISMS FOR SPATIAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING
One explanation for the angular disparity effects present in spatial
updating after imagined rotations is sensorimotor interference.
Despite evidence for the need for mental transformation of the
egocentric reference frame (Rieser, 1989; Presson and Montello,
1994; Easton and Sholl, 1995; Wraga et al., 2000), costs in per-
spective taking have been attributed to a response-based conflict
between one’s real and imagined perspective. This is especially
apparent in pointing tasks where the correct response is incom-
patible with the viewer’s current physical proprioceptive infor-
mation for facing orientation (Wraga, 2003; Avraamides et al.,
2007) and has been shown to be reduced by disorienting partici-
pants before the response (May, 1996). Taken together, this work
suggests that sensorimotor processes may underlie spatial per-
spective taking given the disparity in imagined and real locations
influences task performance.
Recent work suggests the influence of the vestibular system
in imagined perspective taking as well (Mast et al., 2007). For
example, van Elk and Blanke (2013) asked participants to perform
imagined viewer rotation while being passively rotated clockwise
or counterclockwise. By passively rotating the participants the
authors were able to separate some of the proprioceptive cues
used in active rotation from the vestibular signals. When the par-
ticipants were being passively rotated in the same direction that
they imagined rotating their viewpoint, reaction times were faster
than when the passive rotation was incongruent to the imagined
rotation direction. Grabherr et al. (2011) compared patients with
unilateral and bilateral vestibular loss on egocentric and object
mental transformation tasks. They found that those with bilateral
loss showed significantly poorer performance in the egocentric
transformation task than unilateral loss patients. In healthy par-
ticipants, galvanic vestibular stimulation (GVS, direct electrical
stimulation of vestibular end organs) has been shown to lead to
poorer performance on imagined viewer rotation (Grabherr et al.,
2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Dilda et al., 2012).
There are other accounts that may better explain certain types
of perspective taking tasks, such as the visibility tasks (PT-1)
described above. For example, there is evidence that for visibility
tasks, judgments about what another can do may be solved
based on visual-spatial processing that do not require a shift to an
imagined viewpoint (Kelly et al., 2004; Michelon and Zacks, 2006;
Kessler and Rutherford, 2010). Predicting whether an object
is visible from another agent’s viewpoint is likely performed
without a transformation of one’s egocentric frame of reference.
Rather, the answer can be computed based on an object-to-object
based strategy, where a mental line is constructed from the agent
to the target. While a viewer-based transformation could be
used to solve the task, the lack of an angular disparity effect
suggests that the line-of-sight computation is used. There is little
evidence in support of any body-based simulation underlying
this type of judgment. An open question for the current paper
is how mechanisms for spatial perspective taking may or may
not be related to affordances and how they may work together to
coordinate action.
Several of the mechanisms proposed for spatial perspective
taking involve sensorimotor processing. Likewise, one dominant
account for the understanding of other’s actions—particularly
the observation of other’s overt actions—is also framed in the
motor system. If perceiving other’s affordances and spatial per-
spective taking rely on similar mechanisms, then this suggests
that they may be functionally related with respect to social coor-
dination. While on one hand motor simulation may underlie
both processes, we must concede that it is possible that it does
not account for either process. As described above, there is rel-
atively strong support for the use of perceptual information
available to the other, not the self, in judging other’s affordances.
Further, there is evidence that non-motor, visual-spatial process-
ing may be used for at least some Level-1 (Kessler and Rutherford,
2010) and Level-2 (Amorim et al., 2006; Creem-Regehr et al.,
2007) perspective taking tasks. We consider the evidence for both
motor simulation and non-simulation/visual-information based
accounts of perceiving other’s affordances below.
MECHANISMS FOR PERCEIVING AFFORDANCES FOR OTHERS
Gibson’s (1979) concept of affordances and much of the work
following this theoretical viewpoint was concerned with char-
acterizing perception at the level of the observer-environment
system. As with any psychological process, one may ask how the
process is supported by our biology. While the theory of affor-
dances did not attempt to address questions about the underlying
neurocognitive mechanisms involved, there is a related notion of
object-based affordances, alluded to in the work of Costantini
et al. (2011) above, which elicits motor system activation and
could help to explain the mechanisms underlying the prediction
and use of other’s affordances. Numerous studies with objects
have shown that affordances may be automatically activated and
lead to subsequent effects on the motor system. For example,
a classic behavioral study by Tucker and Ellis (1998) showed a
response compatibility effect. When presented with images of
objects with handles, responses to an irrelevant stimulus feature
were facilitated when the handle orientation was congruent with
the hand used tomake the response. Neuroimaging has supported
this claim, showing that activation of related premotor and pari-
etal cortex results from simply viewing objects such as tools that
have affordances (Chao and Martin, 2000; Creem-Regehr and
Lee, 2005). It is important to note, however, that goal context has
been shown to be important in modulating activity across both
cognitive and neural approaches. Buxbaum and Kalenine (2010)
provide compelling examples of how motor resonance may only
occur in the context of goal-directed, functional representations
of objects, rather than simply the structure of the object itself (see
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 596 | 8
Creem-Regehr et al. Perspective taking and other’s affordances
also, Creem-Regehr et al., 2007). Can the neurocognitive notion
of object affordances (mostly focused on grasping) be extended to
environmental affordances such as those for passing through and
sitting? We discuss this possibility in terms of motor resonance
theory below.
MOTOR RESONANCE
The “mirror neuron” system is a specific brain mechanism pro-
posed to underlie motor simulation during action observation.
Mirror neurons were identified initially in the ventral premo-
tor and parietal cortices of the macaque monkey. They activate
both when the monkey performs an action as well as when
the monkey observes another human or monkey perform the
same action (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).
A body of work has proposed an analogous system in humans,
including the premotor cortex, inferior parietal cortex, and supe-
rior temporal sulcus, with specificity to the level of somatotopic
representation of specific body parts (Buccino et al., 2001) and
tuning to the actual motor capabilities and experiences of the
actor (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005, 2006). Subsequent research has
defined some mirror neurons as goal-related rather than effector-
specific (Fogassi et al., 2005; Rochat et al., 2010). For example,
Fogassi et al. (2005) foundmirror neurons in the monkey inferior
parietal lobule that responded to observation of the same grasping
action differentially as a function of the goal of the action. Neurons
were selective for the goals of grasping-to-eat vs. grasping-to-
place. Similarly, in humans, Iacoboni et al. (2005) varied whether
an observed grasping movement was performed in the context
of goals of drinking or cleaning up. Premotor cortex activity was
modulated by the context and intention of the grasp depicted.
The importance of understanding a hierarchy of goals has been
emphasized by several researchers (Grafton and Hamilton, 2007;
Thill et al., 2013). Also, when performing a joint action, there
is neural activity associated with coordinated (phi 2) and inde-
pendent (phi 1) behavior. Topographically, this activity maps well
to the mirror neuron system, and phi 1 (independent behavior)
may indicate inhibition of the mirror neuron system (Tognoli
et al., 2007). Many have proposed that we understand the actions
of others by means of a motor or embodied simulation system,
although these claims have also stirred much debate. How then,
might this mirror system support the judgments of what others
can do and see?
The term motor resonance refers to the matching of one’s own
action to another’s (Uithol et al., 2011). As Uithol et al. (2011)
described, the term “resonance” comes from the physical phe-
nomenon that two systems oscillate and at the same frequency
and phase as one another. However, in the neurocognitive con-
text of mirror neuron systems, resonance is used more broadly to
describe a mechanism of emulation, in which viewing an action
performed by another leads to activation of neurons in the viewer
that represent that action. Viewers understand actions by match-
ing or simulating the action. Furthermore, the analysis by Uithol
et al. (2011) differentiates between intrapersonal resonance and
interpersonal resonance—a distinction that may be important
for the extension to judging other’s affordances. Intrapersonal
resonance occurs within an individual: a perceptual representa-
tion of observed action is activated and at the same time coupled
with a motor representation (Rizzolatti et al., 2001). This notion
is supported by the common coding theory (Hommel et al., 2001)
in which perception and action share common underlying rep-
resentations. In interpersonal resonance, there is a functional
equivalence between themotor representation of the observer and
the actor, emphasizing shared goals or action plans across the two
actors (Wilson and Knoblich, 2005).
Although there is an extensive literature on the mirror system
mechanisms involved in observation of actions (e.g., Fadiga et al.,
1995; Decety et al., 1997; Johnson-Frey et al., 2003; Iacoboni et al.,
2005), the problem posed by this review is somewhat different. In
most cases of explicit or implicit use of other’s affordances and
of spontaneous use of another’s viewpoint in perspective taking,
there is no overt movement of the other agent. It is possible that
observers use intrapersonal motor resonance to not only emulate
actions, but also to infer and predict future actions (Wilson and
Knoblich, 2005; Sebanz et al., 2006). Specifically, experience and
capabilities or current bodily state could be used to predict the
actions of others. Bosbach et al. (2005) showed the importance of
one’s proprioceptive body information on action understanding
by demonstrating that individuals with impaired sense of touch
and proprioception failed to understand another’s expectation of
weight when observing the action (see also Reed and Farah, 1995;
Daems and Verfaillie, 1999 for posture-based effects). Knoblich
and colleague’s proposal that the observer serves as an initial
model for understanding and predicting action could explain
some of the results discussed so far. For example, the influence of
wearing ankle weights on judging other’s jumping ability would
relate one’s own action capability to judgments for another’s
capabilities (Ramenzoni et al., 2008a). Likewise, the capability
of another agent to reach or not reach a mug could influence
one’s own likelihood of reaching the mug, leading to more or
less priming of the motor system (Costantini et al., 2011). This
claim is supported by more recent work (Cardellicchio et al.,
2013) which used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to
record the motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) of observers. In a vir-
tual environment display, a mug was presented either within or
outside of the observer’s reaching space and within or outside
of an agent’s reaching space. Highest MEPs were measured when
the mug was within either the observer’s reaching space or the
agent’s reaching space, compared to when the mug was outside
of the observer’s reaching space or close to a non-body cylin-
der (which took the place of the avatar/agent). Finally, in joint
actions, there could be neural representations for action based on
each actor’s capabilities that mutually activate in order to support
complementary actions.
INFORMATION-BASED ACCOUNTS
An alternative account of self-other interactions comes from the
ecological viewpoint, emphasizing the direct information about
the environment available to the viewer. As mentioned in the
introduction, this account is not necessarily exclusive of the
motor resonance account, but it emphasizes different aspects of
the processes of social perception-action. As described earlier,
Ramenzoni et al. (2008b) found that viewers used eye-height
scaled information to judge accurately what others could reach,
suggesting that judging other’s affordances relies on viewer-scaled
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optical information. Indeed, Ramenzoni et al. (2010) argued
that the motor resonance account proposes a “strong depen-
dency on the observer’s own action capabilities” (p. 1117) that
is not necessarily supported by the empirical findings. Accounts
based in motor simulation place an emphasis on the attributes
of the perceiver in judging other’s affordances, rather than the
situated perceptual information available to the other agent. In
many cases, studies of judging other’s affordances have shown the
importance of the perceptual information available to the agent,
in contrast to a reliance on the perceiver’s capabilities.
A possible mechanism for this direct use of environmental
information may be explained by the synergistic approach (Riley
et al., 2011). In this approach, observers are thought to be able to
coordinate actions with others through a process of reducing each
other’s degrees of freedom in movement (dimensional compres-
sion) and reacting to the movements of one another (reciprocal
compensation) to create a single coordinated system (Riley et al.,
2011). The synergistic approach extends the work of Nikolai
Bernstein in motor coordination. Bernstein identified that one
major problem for any movement system, such as the human
body, is in regulating all the possible degrees of freedom inherent
to it (e.g., joints, muscle extension/flexion, etc.). Bernstein (1967)
proposed that these degrees of freedom may couple together to
create a synergy. By allowing for synergies, the overall degrees
of freedom are reduced allowing the movement system to work
as a single unified system. In applying the synergistic approach
at the interpersonal level, Riley et al. (2011), consider how two
individuals couple their actions to produce a synergy that ulti-
mately constrains the degrees of freedom in themovement of each
individual. Because viewers have access to concurrent visual infor-
mation from multiple viewpoints and can judge affordances for
another with respect to the other’s bodily information in the con-
text of the environment, they can also interpersonally coordinate
actions. Overall, the synergistic approach describes a process that
allows observers to couple their movements with those of others,
which gives rise to dynamic changes that are not independent in
the two systems (see Kugler and Turvey, 1987; Turvey and Carello,
1996).
The synergistic approach may better explain phenomena such
as understanding the interpersonal exchange in conversations
(Condon and Ogston, 1971) and similar affect in interactions
between mothers and their children (Cohn and Tronick, 1988)
than the motor resonance approach. More related to the current
paper, Ramenzoni (2008) asked participants to coordinate hold-
ing a stick inside a hollowed circle. When circle size was varied,
the task became more or less difficult and as a result, partici-
pants’ hand and torso movements were more or less coordinated
(see also Riley et al., 2011). The main difference between this
approach and that of Sebanz et al. (2006) is the claim that actors’
movements in a coordinated action are not independent of one
another, rather they coordinate to form a new entity with which
to judge affordances. As such, the motor resonance approach
may predict dimensional compression, but it cannot account for
reciprocal compensation due to the assumption that the mir-
ror neurons systems of two individuals are independent of one
another (Riley et al., 2011). In addition, this approach does not
focus on fixed neurological structures causing the activity of other
structures; rather it focuses on the functionality that arises when
many neurological structures interact or couple together, reflect-
ing Bernstein’s (1967) original approach to understanding motor
coordination.
CONCLUSIONS
Perceiving other’s affordances and spatial perspective taking are
two abilities that have traditionally been studied in the domains
of perception and spatial cognition, respectively. While typically
considered separate abilities, they share a common conceptual
foundation of relating self and other perspectives in some way.
An observer must determine how another agent can act or see
the world. While these are skills that are important fundamen-
tally for an understanding of our spatial environment, we argue
that when considered together, they provide a basis for a broader
social function of human behavior prediction critical to our social
coordination with others. In this paper we aimed to provide a
review of the work carried out on other’s affordances and per-
spective taking to show how they are related in the service of
understanding both the actions and intentions of others.
Judging other’s affordances is a means to determine capa-
bility for future action. The literature reviewed shows that in
circumstances of a single other agent, or in dyads, observers are
relatively good at perceiving affordances for others when pro-
vided with enough information to scale judgments to the other’s
body. However, we have proposed that these laboratory-based
affordance judgments are typically more specified in terms of
an action-goal than what occurs in the real world where the
other’s goal may not be as specified. To solve this problem and
identify another’s intentions, the ability of spatial perspective tak-
ing may come into play, allowing an observer to further define
the intention and goal of the other actor. Support for these two
components as complementary processes comes from an analysis
of the similarities between the two, on both computational and
neural mechanism levels.
An analysis of frames of reference recruited shows us that
there are at least three possible frameworks used. The viewer may
use their own egocentric frame (as used in judgments of self-
affordances), which may also include a reliance on their own
possibilities for action when judging for others; alternatively, a
viewer’s egocentric frame of reference may be transformed onto
the other’s frame of reference, aligning the self and other reference
frames, typically used in PT-2 tasks; finally, the viewer may simply
use an allocentric frame of reference, computing the relationship
between the other and the target object/environment. Current
work suggests more overlap in the allocentric computation used
in perceiving other’s affordances and PT-1; however, more work is
needed to determine whether egocentric spatial transformations
may be involved in some affordance judgments. Future studies
addressing this question could assess the possible transformation
of the egocentric frame by measuring angular disparity effects
during explicit or implicit affordance judgments with respect to
other agents.
An analysis of motor resonance theory suggests that the sen-
sorimotor mechanisms supporting some forms of perspective
taking and perceiving other’s affordances may overlap. This is
particularly apparent in circumstances in which there is no
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available visual information to make judgments of affordances or
perspective—e.g., insufficient information about kinematics or
the need for updating of spatial relations in a viewer-centered
framework. In these cases, viewers may use motor simulation
to judge the capabilities or perspective of others. Furthermore,
the spontaneous and mutual influence of another agent and the
self, seen in both affordance judgments and perspective taking,
also is consistent with shared spatial and proprioceptive infor-
mation among two people, as well as shared motor processing.
In all, we suggest that judging affordances and spatial perspec-
tive rely on a combination of direct visual information and motor
resonance.
Finally, we have considered how the broader goal of social
cognition could be served by two spatial processes, but it is also
important to consider the possibility of the inverse. Does social
context itself moderate the abilities of perceiving other’s affor-
dances and perspective? The underlying rationale is that in order
to perform a spatial switch of perspectives, one must under-
stand that other agents have different perspectives. Thus, having
a “theory of mind” could be a prerequisite to spatial perspective
taking. The influence of social skills on spatial perspective tak-
ing has been shown in a number of ways. First, individuals with
autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have been studied as a pop-
ulation that is defined with social impairment. Hamilton et al.
(2009) showed a subtle distinction between performance on two
mental rotation tasks in ASD children, finding impairment on
a perspective rotation condition in which the decision required
was with respect to what another person could see, but not on an
object-rotation condition. Shelton et al. (2012) investigated the
influence of social skills on perspective taking by testing a healthy
non-clinical population, but using a questionnaire to assess traits
of ASD. In a version of Piaget’s three mountain task, they asked
observers to choose a picture of a display as it would appear from
another perspective. The location of the other’s perspective was
indicated either by a triangle, camera, or a doll. They found that
perspective taking performance was modulated by social skills,
but only for the doll, such that better social skills were associated
with better perspective taking. Similarly, Kessler andWang (2012)
found that differences in perspective taking emerged as a function
of both sex and social skills.
While not directly the same task as the mostly static affor-
dance or spatial judgments focused on in this paper, there is
also a recent literature on the influence of social context of oth-
ers on executed actions. For example, reach-to-grasp kinematics
are different when passing an object to a partner compared to
placing it in a new location (Becchio et al., 2008) and implicit
social requests for an object have been shown to override an initial
motor plan (Sartori et al., 2009). Together, this work emphasizes
the importance of social context on action planning and the flex-
ibility in online adjustments in action that occur with potential
social interactions.
Clearly, there is a need to consider what may seem to be dis-
parate areas of research to understand complex human behaviors,
such as social coordination and joint action. This review pro-
vides one example for which research on two distinct spatial
processes—judgments of others’ affordances and spatial perspec-
tive taking—may be examined to elucidate potential mechanisms
for more complex behaviors.
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